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Cooperation and Cheating 
 





In this article, we extend the variable delivery claim framework (Cross, Buccola, and 
Thomann, 2006) to examine the option-to-cheat, that is, the option to shift production 
between contracts ex post.  We use this framework to provide a solution to the age-old 
conflict between enforcement and the cooperative tradition of providing a “home” for 
member produce.  We show that, in contrast to Nourse’s competitive yardstick 
hypothesis, the value of the cooperative-provided option increases as market competition 
intensifies.  When the option-to-cheat is fairly-priced, it is Pareto improving, increasing 
grower returns, lowering cooperative per-unit costs and reducing contract shortfalls for 
investor-owned rivals at no additional per-unit cost.  Our valuation framework is 
consistent with replication-based equilibria and is free from parametric specification of 
individual preference or firm cost structure. 
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Cooperation and Cheating 
 
Agricultural cooperatives, under intense competition from investor-owned firms (IOF’s), 
struggle to control over-delivery and under-delivery by growers, that is, cheating.  When 
crop yields are high at harvest time, some members shift excess produce from their IOF 
contracts to their more accommodating cooperative contracts, thereby receiving payment 
for produce that would otherwise be plowed under.  Alternatively, when yields are low, 
some members shift produce away from their cooperative contracts to exploit higher IOF 
prices.  An “extra row” can represent a few percent of contracted acreage and is difficult 
to discern amid harvest activity.  Enforcement by managers can be costly and often 
conflicts with the cooperative philosophy of providing a “home” for member produce. 
Nourse’s (1945) competitive yardstick hypothesis suggests that as market 
competition intensifies the incentive to cooperate wanes.  We introduce a cooperative 
option-to-cheat and prove that its value is, in contrast to Nourse, strictly increasing as 
market competition intensifies.  The cooperative role is transformed from IOF rival to 
beneficial partner. 
Further, when the option-to-cheat is fairly priced it is a Pareto improving market 
mechanism.  Many agricultural markets lack well-regulated, liquidly traded exchanges to 
fulfill contract shortfalls or dispose of excess production.  High storage or transportation 
costs, geographic dispersion, and increasing differentiation all contribute to thin cash 
markets.  Like giving each grower a small personal exchange, the shifting option provides 
cheating growers with a finite crop reserve in case of an IOF contract shortfall, or a    4 
 
destination for a portion of excess production.  Growers who cheat deliver more total 
produce and at better prices, thereby increasing net farm returns.  With fewer contract 
shortfalls, IOF processors face lower delivery volatility with no increase in per-unit costs.  
Higher grower returns allow cooperatives to lower the per-unit forward price paid out to 
members. 
Recent research effort has focused on detecting fraudulent crop insurance claims 
(Atwood, Robinson-Cox, and Shaik, 2006), designing compliance incentives for 
conservation programs (Giannakas and Kaplan, 2005) and pollution permit markets 
(Milak, 2006), and determining optimal tax enforcement for multinational firms (Peralta, 
et al., 2006).  We extend the Variable Delivery Claim (VDC) framework (Cross, Buccola, 
and Thomann, 2006) to value the option-to-cheat and derive balanced forward contract 
prices.  This framework is consistent with replication-based equilibria, thin markets, and 
heterogeneous contract terms, and provides estimates that are independent of parametric 
specification of individual preferences or firm cost structures. 
 
Economic and Contracting Environment 
To begin, we extend the cooperative economy of Cross and Buccola (2004), in which two 
processors, a cooperative and an IOF, purchase raw product from growers.  The IOF 
processor has some monopoly power in its finished good market, whereas the cooperative 
supplies a separate and competitive output market.  As an alternative buyer of raw 
product, the cooperative poses a credible threat to the IOF processor, enabling grower 
members to extract any IOF monopolistic rent.    5 
 
There is no cash market for raw product.  Therefore, growers forward contract 
half their acreage with the cooperative and half with the IOF.  Denote these time t = T 
payoffs 1,T X   2,T X , respectively.  The cooperative contract pays a relatively low, fixed 
forward price 1,1 s  for all produce harvested.  In contrast, the IOF pays a relatively high, 
fixed forward price 2,1 s  for produce, but only up to a set threshold  1 k and nothing 
thereafter  2,2 0 s = . 
(figure 1 here) 
  Figure 1 above illustrates contract revenue per acre associated with two simplified 
contracts over a range of ex post agricultural yield levels  T Y , where T is the terminal 
period.  Here, for illustration, the cooperative contract pays  1,1 s  = $1 per unit of produce 
harvested.  The IOF contract pays  2,1 s  = $2 per unit harvested up to a threshold of  1 k  = 5 
units, and nothing thereafter.  
  The grower’s combined revenue from the portfolio of two contracts (and two 







= ∑ , as illustrated in figure 
2 below. 
(figure 2 here) 
Notice that the cooperative contract 1,T X  is an affine (J = 0) variable delivery 
claim and 2,T X  is a piece-wise linear variable delivery claim with one kink (J = 1).  The 
combined portfolio payoff is also a J = 1 variable delivery claim.    6 
 
Now consider a grower with the willingness and ability to shift some proportion, 








= ∑ , at time T.  Let the shift amount δ  be a percentage of total agricultural yield 
T Y , and let it take on values in the closed interval [ ] , α α − , where α  is some positive 
constant α + ∈ℜ .  This interval may represent the limits of the grower’s inscrutability, a 
formal or tacit allowance to by the holder, or perhaps the cheating threshold below which 
the grower believes detection will not occur. The cheating grower then chooses the 








= ∑ .   
(figure 3 here) 
The upper-most dashed-line in Figure 3 illustrates the payoff associated with the 
cheating portfolio.  Notice that the cheating portfolio payoff has three kinks (J = 3), two 
of which are determined directly from the magnitude of the cheating parameterα  and the 
original threshold value  1 k .   
Figure 3 also illustrates the revenue realized from each of the individual contracts 
() 1,T X δ  and  () 2,T X δ .  Notice that when terminal yield exactly matches the IOF delivery 
threshold  1 T Yk = , there is no incentive to cheat.  This is because, a one-unit shift from 
contract one to contract two results in a loss of  $1 in return for $0 gain, since contract 
two pays nothing for excess production.  Alternatively, a one-unit shift from contract two 
to contract one results in a $2 loss in return for a gain of $1, the cooperative’s low price    7 
 
per unit.  Thus, no shifting takes takes place.  When terminal yield coincides with the 
lower kink at  1 T Yk = /(1 α + ), the grower will shift enough produce from contract one to 
fulfill contract two, which is the maximum allowable shift (δ  = -α ).  This results in a 
reduced payoff for contract one and an elevated payoff for contract two, as indicated by 
the two dashed lines. 
Finally, the lower most dashed line represents the net additional revenue from 
shifting product, () T Z α , which is simply the difference between the portfolio payoff with 
and without cheating:  








=− ∑∑ , 
See the technical appendix for the general specification of  ( ) T Z α .  Notice that under this 
non-negative payoff the grower “cannot lose” by addition the cheating option.  We will 
formalize this important concept later. 
  Though less central to our problem, both processors ensure that standard 
production practices are followed by specifying a set of fixed and variable inputs to be 
applied throughout production period at a cost of  [] 0,T C .  Because of the variable inputs, 
this value is path dependent. 
 
Valuation 
We will use the valuation method corresponding to the missing asset market of Björk 
(1998), in which the underlying yield process is observable, but not tradable.  Valuation is 
based on the existence of a replicating portfolio, or arbitrage portfolio.  We define an    8 
 
arbitrage opportunity, following Harrison and Pliska (1981), as any self-financing 
investment strategy  t φ , with payoff  t π  at time t, fulfilling the weak arbitrage condition 
(2)  [ ] 0 0, 0, 0 TT ππ π =≥ > E , 
whereEis the conditional expectation operator.  Initial and terminal periods are denoted 0 
and T, respectively.   
We model the underlying yield process Yt as the usual adapted Geometric 
Brownian Motion (GBM), defined in the probability space ( ) ,,
ρ Ω F P , where 
ρ P  is the 
probability measure with synthetic drift termρ , Ω the sure event, and F  the filtration.  
The equation of motion for yield is then given by 
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with driftρ , volatilityσ , and initial value Y0. 
  The discount process  t β  is the inverse of the risk-free bond  t B .  The bond evolves 




− = , 
where B0 is a constant and r the risk-free rate.  
  Two notions of “value” can be ascribed to the option-to-cheat:  For the cheater, 
the option leads to additional net revenue, given a fixed schedule of forward prices.  For 
the cooperative, a formalized option-to-cheat leads to a lower forward price paid to 
growers, a rebalanced forward contract.    9 
 
The payoff associated with the option-to-cheat  ( ) T Z α  can be represented by a (J 
= 3) variable delivery claim,  
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. 
Cheating thus provides not a single option, but a sum of European-style “plain vanilla” 
call options with strike thresholds kα , weighted by a schedule of fixed prices sα .  This is 
a special case
1 of the general cheating option provided in the appendix.   
Denote the ex ante value function  [ ] V i .  The value of  ( ) T Z α is then 
(8)  () ( ) TT T ZZ
ρ α βα = ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ VE ,    10 
 
where 
ρ E  is the discounted conditional expectation operator with respect to the synthetic 
drift termρ  and information up to time t = 0.  As seen in figure 3, the payoff  () T Z α is 
everywhere non-negative, leading to a strictly positive expected value and thus an 
arbitrage opportunity, as in (2).  
It remains to determine by how much the cooperative must reduce forward price 







= ∑ .  By the 
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⎣⎦ ∑ E . 
The general expression for the variable delivery claim , iT X  is given by 
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where 0 s  is zero,  0 k  is the lower limit of  T Y , and  [] 0,T C  is the path-dependent input cost 
rule.  Holding all other forward prices fixed, we then solve (10) for the arbitrage-free first 
forward price 
*
1,1 s  ,  
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To test Nourse’s (1992) competitive yardstick hypothesis, we want to know how the 
cheating option value changes as market competition intensifies, that is, as the forward 
price offered by the IOF is driven up by either a rival cooperative, collective bargaining, or 
competing IOF’s.  Because cheating exploits price differentials between contracts, forces 
that increase these differentials, such as IOF competition, enhance the value of cheating.  
To formalize this, consider the non-trivial case, in which at least some cheating occurs and 
the IOF contract accepts some delivery,  1 ,k α > 0.  Also, let the expected terminal yield is 
not zero,  [ ] T Y
ρ E > 0.  Under these conditions, we provide our central claim: 
Claim:  The value of the cheating option increases as market competition 
intensifies: 









where  2,1 s  is the IOF forward price,  1 ,k α > 0, and  [ ] T Y
ρ E > 0.    12 
 
The proof is provided in the appendix and follows directly from the first order 
condition 
(15)  ()










+ + ∂⎡ ⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎡⎤ =+ − − + − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ∂
V
E . 
We illustrate the values of this condition over a range of cheating and threshold levels in 
the results section. 
  We are also interested in how two other economic forces affect the value of the 
cheating option:  technical innovation and maturing capital markets.  Technological 
innovation, such as GMO crops, improves agricultural productivity, leading to higher 
yields or reduced production volatility or both.  Interestingly, neither the Black-Scholes 
(1973) nor the Björk (1998) valuation models are a function of the “native drift,” that is 
the rate of increase in yield over time.  Both depend on the synthetic drift term to obtain 
arbitrage-free derivative values.  Thus, yield-enhancing innovation does not affect the 
value of the option to cheat, ceteris paribus.  Techological innovation that reduces yield 
volatility, however, have an important impact on the value of yield-based derivative 
options.  In the results section, we will examine derivative of the value of cheating with 
respect to yield volatility, as given by 






  Finally, as capital markets mature, interest rates tend to fall and risk premiums 
narrow.  The cooperative is uniquely suited to raise equity in thin capital markets, due to 
its ability to retain equity from member patronage (Cross and Buccola, 2004).  We are    13 
 
therefore interested in cheating option values as interest rates and risk premiums decrease.  
If the value of cheating also wanes as capital markets mature, the following first order 









This condition is also illustrated in the results section. 
 
Estimation Methods 
Because no convenient analytical expression exists for the density of the arithmetic 
average of log-normal random variables (Kemna and Vorst, 1990), we employ standard 
Monte Carlo Integration (Boyle, Brodie, and Glasserman, 1997), which is consistent, 
asymptotically normal, and accurate to an arbitrary level depending on the number of 
draws m (Campbell, 1997). 
 
Data 
To illustrate the value of the cheating option, both from the grower and cooperative 
perspective, we begin with the arbitrage-free market of Cross, Buccola, and Thomann 
(2006).  This market corresponds to the missing asset market, in which cooperative and 
IOF processors each contracted processing tomatoes under one of two standardized 
variable delivery claims.  Tri Valley Growers, the large and now defunct cooperative 
processor, competed with a number of large investor-owned rivals, including Hunts, 
Heinze, Ragu, Campbell’s, and others.  We consider the 20-year period from 1977 to    14 
 
1996 when financial difficulties at Tri Valley became widely known, and utilize both raw 
data and estimated model parameters from this study. 
IOF forward prices are published by the California Tomato Growers Association 
(1977-2001).  These prices, along with Tri Valley Grower’s arbitrage-free forward price 
estimates with and without cheating are illustrated in figure 5 in the results section.  All 
value terms are expressed in constant 2005 dollars adjusted using the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) as published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Kern County yield data and delivery threshold estimates are illustrated below in 
figure 4 over the 20-year study period.  Yield volatilityσ  was estimated to be 0.1849, 
resulting in a market price of risk estimate of $0.32 per unit of volatility.  This premium is 
added to the risk free interest rate to obtain synthetic drift parameters.  The 3-month U.S. 
Treasury index is used for the risk-free rate.  It averaged 7% and ranged from a high of 
14% in 1981 to a low of 3% in 1993. 
(figure 4 here) 
Arbitrage-free farm production costs parameters are estimated from studies 
published by the University of California Cooperative Extension Service (UCCES) 
(Valencia, et al, 2002a, 2002b).   
For illustration, we use a cheating magnitude of α  = 0.10, except where 
otherwise stated.  Interviews with cooperative managers suggest that actual shifting 
varied widely across members and over time, based on changing market conditions and 
cooperative enforcement policy. 
    15 
 
Results 
The introduction of the cheating option reduces the aribtrage-free cooperative forward 
price by 6.7% on average or $5.60 per ton, with a high of 8.5% in 1990 and a low of 
3.8% in 1994.  Figure 5 below illustrates cooperative prices with and without cheating 
along with IOF forward prices for comparison. 
(figure 5 here) 
  Average deliveries and delivery volatilities are illustrated for the cheating and 
non-cheating case in figure 6 below.  We note two key implications:  First, average 
deliveries increase under cheating for both the cooperative and IOF contracts.  Deliveries 
to the IOF processor increase because of fewer contract shortfalls.  Cooperative deliveries 
increase because growers shift produce from the IOF contract to the cooperative in years 
of surplus.  Second, cheating increases delivery volatility for the cooperative, shifting 
volatility away from the IOF processor.  A close look at the two contracts with no 
cheating suggests why the additional liquidity provided by a formal shifting mechanism 
may be Pareto improving.  The basic design of the IOF contract, with no cheating, 
already leads to more stable, targeted deliveries at higher per-unit costs (forward prices).  
This is consistent with the expectations of the more stable, higher-value, branded output 
markets served by Hunts, Heinz, Ragu, Campbell’s, and other IOF’s.  By contrast, the 
cooperative contract, with no cheating, leads to higher volatility and lower per-unit costs 
(forward prices), consistent with the needs of the lower-value, commodity-style markets 
served by Tri Valley Growers.  Cheating strengthens the relative differences between the 
two contracts, reducing shortfalls for the IOF processor and providing a home for    16 
 
cooperative member produce.  These improvements cause no additional per-unit costs to 
the IOF and lower per-unit costs to the cooperative. 
(figure 6 here) 
The extent to which competitive pressure enhances the value of cheating is 
expressed by first order condition (14).  The higher this value, the greater the 
enhancement.  This condition is clearly dependent on two parameters of interest: the 
potential degree of cheating α  and the IOF delivery threshold  1 k .  As illustrated in figure 
7 below, the first order condition is everywhere positive and increasing in both variables. 
(figure 7 here) 
  This raises the question of why the IOF processor would not enter the 
commodity-style output market, thereby internalizing the shifting mechanism and 
eliminating a competitor.  One factor could be return-on-equity.  Publicly-traded IOF’s 
achieved significantly higher and more stable net returns than did Tri Valley Growers 
during the study period (Cross and Buccola, 2004).  Returns in the commodity-style 
markets may appear unattractive to IOF’s.  Tri Valley Growers attempted at one point to 
enter the higher-value branded market, investing heavily in an unsuccesful branded 
product line (Hariyoga, 2004).  To the extent that crossing competitive lines is either 
unattractive or costly, the shifting mechanism remains a cooperative-provided service to 
the market. 
Our last graph, figure 8, shows that maturing capital markets depress the value of 
cheating.  Moving along the x-axis labeledρ  in figure 8, as interest rates fall the value of 
cheating decreases for all levels of volatility.  The impact of volatility-reducing    17 
 
technological innovation, however, is interest rate dependent.  For high levels ofρ , 
innovation enhances the value of cheating.  For lower values ofρ , by contrast, cheating 
values decline as volatility ebbs.  This result is reasonable, given the fact that higher 
returns are required when interest rates and risk-premiums are high. 
(figure 8 here) 
 
Conclusion 
This article extends the VDC framework (Cross, Buccola, Thomann, 2006) to the 
problem of crop shifting, an age-old problem, encouraged by cooperative social norms, 
discouraged by fair-minded managers, lenders, and retired members.  We found the 
fairly-priced shifting provision to be Pareto-improving, transforming the cooperative 
from IOF-adversary to beneficial partner.  The cheating-option increases grower net 
returns, lowers cooperative per-unit costs, and avoids IOF production shortfalls at no 
additional per-unit cost to the IOF.  Because equity returns may be lower for member-
owned firms than for investor-owed firms, traditional and new-generation cooperatives 
are equally well-suited to provide this option.  Finally, we showed that as market 
competition proliferates, the value of cheating option increases, as shifters exploit 
widening forward price differentials.      18 
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Appendix to Cooperation and Cheating 
General formula for the option to cheat 
The cheating payoff () T Z α  from equation (5) can be expressed as functions of the 
cheating limit α + ∈ℜ  and terminal yield  T Y , as follows:  
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Here, the cheating payoff takes on values over three region-types Dj,1, D j,2, and D j,3,  j = 
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Figure 3 illustrates each of the three region types.Regions Dj,1,  j = 1,…,J, 
correspond to terminal yield values that lie between contract thresholds, such that no 
thresholds  j k  lie within the interval ( ) 1 T Y δ +  for any possible value of  [ ] , δ αα ∈− .  
Regions D j,2 correspond to terminal yield values just below the thresholds  j k , such that 
() 1 T Y α +  reaches or exceeds the threshold.  Finally, regions D j,3 correspond to terminal 
yield values just above the thresholds  j k , such that ( ) 1 T Y α −  reaches or exceeds the 
threshold.   
 
Proof of the claim 
From the identity in (15), the claim is true, if the following inequality holds: 
(A.7)  () ( ) () ( ) 11 10 TTT T YY k Y k
ρ βα α
+ + ⎡⎤ +− − + − > ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
E . 
Passing the expectation through, we will show directly that 
(A.8)  [] () ( ) () 11 10 TT T YY k Y k
ρρ αα
+ + ⎡⎤ +− − + − >
⎣⎦
EE . 
The relationship is equality if eitherα  or  1 k  is zero.  Therefore, let  1 ,k α > 0.  Expressing 
the conditional expectation operator as an integral, the LHS of (A.8) is    21 
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.  Changing the limits of 
integration again and canceling terms, we can rewrite our derivative  
(A.11)  () ( )
0









−− ≡ ∫∫ . 
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  .  So,  ( ) 0 F α > , verifying our claim.    22 
 
 
                                                 
1 The contracts of interest are defined by convex contract payoffs  1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2 , ss ss ≤ ≤  and  
the relative price relationships illustrated in figure 1, specifically,  1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2 , ss ss ≤ ≥  and 
1,1 2,2 1,2 2,1 , ss ss ≥≤ . 





















Figure 1:  Simplified cooperative and IOF contract payoffs over a range of terminal yield values  
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Figure 8:  Cheating option values over a range of volatility and drift levels  